金禾工作坊

经济学报告会

报告人：Li Hao

报告题目： Perceptions, Intentions, and Cheating

时间：2013年7月3日（周三）下午2:30-4:30

地点：西安交大文管大楼874教室

摘要：We report data from a laboratory experiment demonstrating that cheating is significantly deterred when a possible intent to cheat must be revealed before, rather than after, a potentially dishonest act. Further, data from independent evaluators suggests a reason: the same action is more likely to be perceived as dishonest when cheating could have been planned, as compared to cases when it seems simply impulsive. Overall, we find the vast majority of participants prefer to appear honest, but only a minority prefers actually to be honest. Finally, we conduct a type-classification analysis that implies that after establishing an honest appearance people cheat to the greatest extent possible. It follows that the “incomplete cheating” behavior frequently reported in the literature may be due more to a preference for maintaining an honest appearance than an intrinsic aversion to cheating.

报告人简介：Li Hao is an assistant Professor of Economics in Walton College of Business,University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. She got the Ph.D.of economics in George Mason University. Research Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics

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