金禾工作坊

杨春雷教授经济学报告会（二）

报告人：杨春雷教授

报告题目： On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner’s Dilemma Games

时间：2013年6月114日（周五）上午10:00-12:00

地点：西安交大文管大楼874教室

摘要：When the repeated prisoner’s dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we describe the upper limit of discounted lifetime payoff and construct simple social conventions that, for a large set of parameters, achieve it. While all other well-known equilibrium designs in the literature punish defections with a breakup and thus reach the optimum only in degenerate cases, exploited cooperators in ours allow defectors to compensate them by cooperating more in the future.

报告人简介：杨春雷教授为德国多特蒙大学经济学博士，现任台湾中央研究院人文社会科学研究中心研究员，有多篇文章发表于JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, ECONOMICS BULLETIN, ECONOMICS THEORY 等学术期刊，主要研究领域为Microeconomics, Game Theory, Experiment.

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