报告人：韩雍

时间：2015年7月23日（周四）下午4:00—5:30

地点：西安交大文管大楼868教室

报告题目：Auctions with Best Offer: Evidence from eBay

内容摘要：This paper studies for the Best Offer selling mechanism on eBay that has not been studied much in the literature. In this mechanism, the sellers will actively haggle with the potential buyers and bargain over the price. Using the data from eBay Motors, we find the BIN price will be set substantially highest under Best Offer format. Furthermore, we investigate the transaction results under four listing formats and find that Best Offer format has the lowest transaction probability, but fetches the highest price if the item is sold. The result implies that the sellers who view sale price as more important than sale probability prefer the best offer format to the other formats.

报告人简介：韩雍，西安交通大学金禾中心应用经济学博士生，主要研究领域为拍卖理论和网络拍卖实证。

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