报告题目：Bargaining versus Fixed-Price Sale: Evidence from eBay Motors
报告人：韩雍

评论人：杨兴哲

时间：2016年3月11日（周五）下午3:00—5:00
地点：西安交大文管大楼874教室

内容摘要：This paper empirically compares between bargaining and fixed-price sale by using data of the fixed-price and the Best-Offer listings in eBay motors. We first show that, consistent with the view that bargaining incurs more cost than price posting, the sellers who list more items are more likely to adopt the fixed-price sale. We then show that Best-Offer results in higher sale rate but, if the item reaches a sale, no significant difference in transaction price. Moreover, by identifying a variable as the proxy for the seller’s bargaining power, we show that the greater bargaining power the seller has, the more likely she is to adopt the fixed-price listing, a result, though counter-intuitive, is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Bester (1993).
报告人简介：韩雍，西安交通大学金禾中心应用经济学博士生。拍卖理论和网络拍卖实证。

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