报告人:韩文卿

评论人：朱佳鸿

时间：2016年4月1日（周五）下午3:00—5:00

地点：西安交大文管大楼874教室

报告题目：Optimal Concession Contracts for Landlord Port Authorities Pursuing Different Goals

内容摘要：This paper investigates how landlord port authorities should offer concession contracts to terminal operators under their different goals. First, we presume that port authorities aim to maximize the weighted sum of fee revenue and throughout benefit, i.e., a generalization of Chen and Liu (2014, 2015). Employing a two-stage game, we discover that the optimal concession contract can be any of the fixed-fee, the unit-fee, and the two-part tariff schemes; depending on the weights assigned to fee revenue and throughput benefit, the marginal costs of terminal operators, the marginal benefits of throughput, and the service differentiation degrees of the operators. The outcomes of Chen and Liu (2014, 2015) are special cases of ours. Second, if port authorities aim to maximize the social welfare, we find that subsidizing terminal operators, instead of charging them, is the authorities’ best choice.

报告人简介：韩文卿，西安交通大学金禾中心应用经济学博士生。

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