主讲人：Wolfgang leininger 教授

  题目：Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests

  时间：2017年9月22日晚上19：00-21：00

  地点：文管大楼874教室

  摘要：

We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants.

Two instruments of favoritism are considered: Head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and multiplicative biases that give idiosyncratic weights to the bids. In the all-pay auction, head starts are more effective than biases while optimally combining both instruments even yields first-best revenue. In the lottery contest, head starts are less effective than biases and combining both instruments cannot further increase revenue. As all-pay auctions revenue-dominate lottery contests under optimal biases, we thus obtain an unambiguous revenue-ranking of all six combinations of contest formats and instruments.

    报告人简介： Leininger教授是德国经济学界著名的教授，学术成果非常丰富，获得过多项经济学国际著名奖项和奖章。

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