时 间：2月28日 (周二)下午 4:15
简 介：孙永洪(Sun Yonghong)，香港城市大学资讯系统学博士，现为西安交通大学信息管理与电子商务系Assistant Professor。主要研究方向为，应用微观经济学(Applied Microeconomics)，电子商务(E-Commerce)等。曾在IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management，IEEE. Transactions on SMC Part A，European Journal of Operational Research，Expert Systems with Applications等期刊发表论文。
题 目：Motivation Crowding Out? The Youtube Case
论文摘要：Motivation crowding theory means that agents’ intrinsic motivation is crowded out by external reward such that they would contribute less effort to do something. This contradicts the traditional price theory that agents would increase effort level when they are given more reward. According to Frey and Jegen (2001), there are two reasons for crowding effect appearing. One is that external incentives may force agents to act in a specific way such that they feel their freedom of self-determination is impaired. The other reason is that external incentives make agents think that the value or motivation of their behaviors is not properly appreciated.Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel (2011) discussed the general aspects of how external incentives crowding out intrinsic motivation in areas like education, public goods provision and habits forming.
In this paper, we examine the crowding effect in the setting of Youtube, the largest video sharing platform in the world. Founded in February 2005, Youtube provided a platform for individual users to upload and share video clips that they created. However, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in January 27th 2007, YouTube founder Chad Hurley announced that Youtube were preparing to share advertisement revenues with individual users who upload their own video films. Given the fact that those video clips uploaded become public goods in the sharing space, and users involving the sharing activity are just for fun and socializing, we try to examine whether the external incentive (ads revenue sharing here) really crowd out users’ intrinsic motivation for sharing. We find that after this news was released, the contribution levels of users decreased by 25.3 percent on average. However, after we take the seasonal effect into consideration, we find that this ads revenue sharing program actually doesn’t crowd out but crowd in users’ contribution. The decline of contribution levels mentioned above is just due to that seasonal effect dominates the incentive effect. Furthermore, we find that the more social benefits contributors enjoy, the more the decline in their contribution due to seasonal effect.