题目：Testing Fare Evasion in the Lab: The Moral Cost of Dishonesty
内容提要：We study the impact of the size of deception on cheating behavior for various probabilities of detection and various amounts of fine in risky or ambiguous environments. We combine the control offered by the laboratory environment with the realism from using a representative sample of the adult population using public transportations in a big French city. For this sample, we are able to identify actual cheating behavior in public transportations. In this artefactual field experiment, subjects make successive decisions between buying and not buying a ticket for various distances, a longer distance without a ticket representing a bigger deception than a short distance fare dodging. Our results show that: (1) Both fare-dodgers and non-fare-dodgers in real life respond to changes in the certainty, the detection probability, and the severity of punishment. (2) Actual fare-dodgers cheat significantly more in the game than non-fare-dodgers. (3) The cheating rate is significantly lower for longer distances even in the common knowledge absence of control, suggesting that even actual fare-dodgers have moral costs of lying.
讲座人简介： 代志新老师是中国人民大学财政金融学院财政系讲师，毕业于法国里昂大学，获得经济学博士学位。他的研究方向有实验经济学，行为经济学，公共经济学，财政学和行为金融等。他的代表性学术成果“Ambiguity on Audits and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game with Sanctions”,“Cheating in the Lab Predicts Cheating in the Field! An Experiment in Public Transportations”发表于European Economic Review和Management Science的期刊上。