金禾工作坊

经济学报告会

ª报告人：Liyu Ye

ª报告题目：Loan Trades and Syndicate Structures

ª时间：2012年12月14日 下午2:00- 4:30

ª地点：西安交大文管大楼868教室

内容摘要：

This paper examines how the availability and efficiency of a liquid secondary market affect the syndicate

structures in the primary loan market. We find that lead arrangers retain larger shares and loan syndications

are more concentrated when lenders anticipate a liquid secondary market. These findings are more

prominent when borrowers are informationally transparent and in sound financial conditions. Lenders hold

even larger shares of loans when the secondary market is available quickly after loan originations or when

the loans could sell without discounts. We also find that borrowing costs are more than 80 basis points lower

when lenders had loans traded in the secondary market in the previous year. The evidence is consistent with

the hypothesis that the secondary market lowers lenders' cost of capital and increases demand in the primary

market. We find little evidence supporting that loan trades damage arrangers' monitoring incentives or make

loan renegotiations difficult.

ª报告人简介：Liyu Ye is a PH.D candidate in Finance from A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane

University. Her research interests focus on financial market intermediation, investment banking, and other

corporate finance topics.

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