Lecture: “Uniform Price Mechanisms for Threshold Public Goods Provision with Private Value Information: Theory and Experiment”

【Abstract】 This paper compares two novel uniform price mechanisms for provision point public goods to standard provision point (PPM) and proportional rebate (PR) mechanisms within a Bayesian game with private value information. The uniform price auction mechanism (UPA) collects an endogenously determined uniform price from everyone offering at least that price, while the uniform price cap mechanism (UPC) collects the uniform price from everyone offering at least that price, plus the full offer of everyone offering less. By rebating full amounts in excess of the price, the uniform price mechanisms create regions where the expected increase in payment associated with a higher offer is zero. We show that the uniform price mechanisms support Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) with higher contributions than BNE of PPM or PR, potentially increasing efficiency. We use laboratory experiments to test whether these more efficient BNE obtain, leading to higher contributions or more frequent provision. Our mechanisms outperform PR and PPM with private values: UPC generates higher aggregate contributions and provision rates than PR and PPM; UPA attracts much higher contributions, although it provides less frequently. This ranking emerges because high offers are more common (especially among high-value people) in the uniform price mechanisms, where it is low cost to venture high offers to potentially meet other high offers to support provision.

对象：全体教师、硕士生、博士生

时间：11月18日（周五）下午3:00-5:00

地点：金禾中心868

Prof. Zhi Li

李智博士毕业于University of Washington (华盛顿大学)。目前为厦门大学王亚南经济研究院(WISE)助理教授。李智博士在应用微观经济学，如实验经济学，资源环境经济学领域有很杰出的表现。目前已经以第一作者在国际顶尖期刊Journal of Public Economics, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review上发表论文。